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WHAT GOOGLE CAN'T TELL US ABOUT INTERNET
AUCTIONS (AND WHAT IT CAN)
Christine Hurt*
I. INTRODUCTION
N O initial public offering (IPO) in the history of the United States capital
markets has been discussed as intensely as the August 2004 offering of Class
A Common Stock of Google, Inc.' From the announcement of the IPO itself, to the
details of its innovative Internet auction, to the post-IPO share price, the investing
world has been continuously discussing Google for over a year.2 One aspect of
Google's IPO that received much attention before the offering was the fact that
Google chose an online auction process as the mechanism to distribute its original
IPO shares.3 In keeping with Google's nonconformist image, its founders chose an
IPO mechanism that had been used only once or twice a year in the United States.4
Many detractors of the traditional bookbuilding mechanism declared that the Google
auction foreshadowed an upheaval in the cliquish investment banking industry.5
However, after the offering had taken place and the share price was on the rise,
public attention gradually turned to Google's future, ending general debate on
discussions of the auction process. Although some industry insiders had predicted
that Google's auction would be the beginning of a trend,6 critics blamed the auction
process for low investor demand in the weeks leading up to the offering and for a
last-minute slash in the price range.7 In addition, in the year after the Google
auction, only two other issuers launched an online PO.'
Observers of the intersection of the Internet and the securities markets are left to
wonder whether the Google auction was a harbinger of change, a meaningless
* Assistant Professor ofLaw, Marquette University Law School. B.A., Texas Tech University;
J.D., University of Texas. The author would like to thank Victor Fleischer, Larry Ribstein and Gordon
Smith for their continuing contributions to the Google conversation.
1. HowARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE 5-8 to 5-9 (2006 Supp.
forthcoming).
2. See Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Google IPO and the Branding Effect of
Corporate Deal Structures 13 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-18, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=790928 (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
3. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 17.
4. Deborah Lohse, Google Breaks the IPO Mold: It Plans Online Auction Process, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/8556861 .htm (describing Google's offering
method as a "little-used" auction).
5. Lohse, supra note 4 (discussing how investment bankers and Silicon Valley financiers were
"stunned" at Google's move and noting that stock sales are "entering a new era").
6. See id.
7. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 19-20.
8. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 5-10 (citing Morningstar lPO Shares at $18.50, CHI. TRIB., May
3, 2005, at C 1; Dutch Auction IPOs Could Lure More Takers; Attraction Grows as Google Hits $300
a Share, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, July I1, 2005).
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electronic blip or a marketing event for the public relations-conscious issuer.9 This
article analyzes this historic IPO and explores its influence on future online IPO
auctions. Unfortunately, its offering cannot be used to herald an immediate change
in the bookbuilding IPO market because Google was a unique issuer in many
positive and negative respects. However, Google's auction will assist other issuers
in negotiating with underwriters for alternative offering mechanisms.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Initial Public Offering Machine
During the first day of trading in an initial public offering, most IPO shares
experience a price increase from the offering price to the closing price for the day.'0
From 1980-2001, the average IPO share price increased during the first day by
18.8%." This first-day "pop" will also be pronounced during "hot" IPO markets, 2
such as the market that existed during the technology boom, specifically in 1999 and
the first half of 2000 (the "1999-2000 Boom"). 3 During this period, the average
first-day increase was 77%. 1" Technology issuers had even more dramatic first-day
share price increases, with one-third of those issuers seeing the share price double
in the first day.' 5 However, after the bursting of the technology bubble in 2001, the
average first-day increase declined to 14%, marking the beginning of a cold IPO
market.' 6 Even in lethargic market environments, the investment bank that
determines an offering price seems to fix that price at a substantial discount from the
price the market will bear. '7
The issuing company sells all its shares at the offering price, so the issuer does not
profit from any share price increase, although insiders who sell shares in the
aftermarket may be able to sell at the higher price.'8 Primarily, persons that are able
to buy IPO shares at the original offering price will capitalize on the spread between
the offering price and the market price. In almost all IPOs conducted in the United
States, the vast majority, almost 80%, of original IPO shares are pre-allocated by the
underwriters of the offering.'9 The recipients of those shares are usually institutional
9. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 13.
10. Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the InitialPublic Offering, 26 CARDozo L. REV. 711,714-
16 (2005) (describing the life cycle of an IPO share).
11. Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review oflPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN.
1795, 1795 (2002).
12. Francois Derrien & Kent L. Womack, Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of
Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets, 16 REV. FIN. STuD. 31, 44 (2003).
13. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 11, at 1796.
14. Melanie Warner, Friends and Family: Sycamore Gave Lots of "Directed Shares" to a Key
Customer, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 2000, at 102.
15. Id.
16. Ritter & Welch, supra note 11, at 1796.
17. See id. at 1802.
18. See id. at 1813.
19. Beatrice Boehmer et al., Do Institutions Receive Favorable Allocations in IPOs with Better
Long Run Returns?, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-350720 (studying a sample of IPOs and determining that 79% of all original
[Vol. 37
INTERNVETAUCTIONS
investors known to the underwriters and regular customers of the underwriters. In
fact, institutional investors receive approximately 75% of original IPO shares in the
average offering.20 In addition, a much smaller number of original IPO shares are
distributed by the issuers to employees, relatives, friends, and business partners as
part of "friends and family" programs.2 As a consequence of the institutional
investor and friends and family allocations, no more than 20% of an offering will
be available for sale at the opening of trading. Those retail investors interested in
investing in a new issuer must buy shares from original recipients at a higher price
in the aftermarket. Generally, institutional investors are the recipients of IPO shares
at the offering price, and later sell their shares to retail investors at a higher price,
pocketing the difference.22
1. Bookbuilding Method
The bookbuilding method gives the lead underwriter full control of the IPO
offering. The underwriter controls how the offering is marketed, how the offering
is priced, who receives the IPO shares, and when share recipients may sell their
shares in the secondary market. Additionally, the underwriter solicits "indications
of interest"' from investors during road shows that take place after the company has
filed its registration statement, but before the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) has declared the statement "effective." Not surprisingly, the only investors
invited to road shows are large, institutional investors and extremely wealthy
individuals.2' Based on the indications of interest received at the road shows, the
underwriter sets the price for the original IPO shares, determines which road show
attendee will receive shares at the original IPO price, and determines the number of
shares each attendee will receive. 25 As noted previously, the underwriter allocates
almost all of the IPO shares available for purchase before the shares are sold on the
open market.26 Additionally, the underwriters employ certain tactics to encourage
original recipients to hold on to their shares and not to sell their shares within the
IPO shares in the sample were allocated before the IPO by the underwriter).
20. Reena Aggarwal et al., Institutional Allocation in Initial Public Offerings: Empirical
Evidence, 57 J. FIN. 1421, 1422 (2002).
21. Renee Deger, IPO Directed Share Plans Pose Risks, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13, 1999, at B5
(describing how before the 1999-2000 Boom, directed share plans generally accounted for 10% or less
of a total offering but grew during this time period).
22. Alexander P. Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and 1PO Pricing 33 (Nov.
6, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=282293 (stating that 92% of shares sold by institutional
investors on the first day of trading are bought by retail investors).
23. See Francesca Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding & Strategic Allocation, 56 J. FN.
2337, 2337 (2001).
24. See Adam Lashinsky, It's Time to Open Up the Road Show: What the SEC Doesn't Want You
to Know, FORTUNE, Nov. 8, 1999, at 338; The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 7606A, Exchange Act Release No. 40,632A, Investment Company Act Release No.
23,519A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174,67,214 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998) (acknowledging that investment banks
generally invite only selected broker-dealers and large investors to road shows).
25. See SEC, Initial Public Offerings: Why Individuals Have Difficulty Getting Shares
[hereinafter SEC, InitialPublic Offerings], athttp://www.sec.gov/answers/ipodiff.htm (modified Nov.
24, 1999).
26. Id.
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first few days ("flip"). Therefore, the number of shares available for purchase in
the first few days is very small. The small number of shares available and any hype
surrounding the offering often create a situation in which demand exceeds the very
small supply.28 This situation ensures that when retail investors do begin buying
shares from original allocatees the first few days of the offering, the price will
increase, producing highly publicized first-day pops.29
The bookbuilding process, complete with the underpricing and pre-allocation of
shares, does not run afoul of any state or federal laws, including securities laws and
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rules. 30  However, recent
scandals have shown that this process is inherently flawed and is open to abuse. 31
During the 1999-2000 Boom, underwriters used the ability to price IPO shares
below the "indications of interest" to then "spin" these shares to potential clients or
valued customers. 32 These shares contained a built-in gain that could be realized by
selling the shares in the first few days at a higher market price.33 This ability to
allocate profit became very powerful and led many investment banks to abuse that
ability.34 The most extreme abuses occurred when investment banks, even the ones
with household names, allocated shares to investors in return for excessive
27. See Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on Flipping IPO
Securities, 74 TUL. L. REv. 883, 885-86 (2000) (detailing underwriters' practices of penalizing broker-
dealers who flip securities and the resulting pressure on broker-dealers to keep their customers from
flipping).
28. See SEC, Initial Public Offerings, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. Christine Hurt, 1PO Spinning in the News (Feb. 22, 2005), at
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/02/ipo spinningin_ 1 .html.
31. See, e.g., Credit Suisse First Boston, Litigation Release No. 18110, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1010
(Apr. 28,2003); Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18111,2003 SEC LEXIS 1009
(Apr. 28, 2003).
32. Hurt, supra note 30.
33. Ritter & Welch, supra note 11, at 1797.
34. The SEC named ten major investment banks in a lawsuit primarily regarding analysts touting
the stock of issuers who were clients of the analysts' own investment banks. See Press Release, SEC,
Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest
Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. In the complaint, both Credit Suisse First Boston and
Solomon Smith Barney were charged with spinning IPO shares in "hot" IPO offerings. See SEC v.
Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC, Litigation Release No. 18110, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1010 (Apr. 28,
2003); SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18111, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1009
(Apr. 28, 2003). In the global settlement of these claims, CSFB and Solomon neither admitted nor
denied these claims. All ten investment banks entered into a Voluntary Initiative Regarding
Allocations of Securities in "Hot" Initial Public Offerings to Corporate Executives and Directors,
agreeing to "place restrictions on the ability of investment banking firms to allocate securities in 'hot'
IPOs," but only to executives and directors of public companies. See SEC, Voluntary Initiative
Regarding Allocations of Securities in "Hot" Public Offerings to Corporate Executives and Directors,
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/globalvolinit.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2005). The terms of the
Voluntary Initiative rendered its expiration upon the passage of new Rule 2790, which is actually more
lax on the subject than the Voluntary Initiative. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS
(NASD) MANuAL (CCH), Rule 2790 (2005), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/
index.html.
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brokerage fees. 5 Subsequently, many brokerage firms have been investigated and
penalized for charging excessive brokerage fees in violation of NASD rules.36
In addition, investment bankers abuse the bookbuilding process by allocating
shares to officers of corporations in return for promises of future lucrative
investment banking business.37  Since the 1999-2000 Boom, the NASD has
proposed Rule 2712, which would prohibit investment bankers from allocating IPO
shares to executives in a quid pro quo transaction. 38 This type of allocation abuse,
unlike allocations matched with the generation of excessive fees, is much harder to
prove without evidence that an office of a corporation would not have chosen a
particular investment bank for an offering had a broker at that investment bank not
allowed that officer to participate in a lucrative IPO months before or after.39
Unfortunately, proposed Rule 2712 has been open for comment for almost four
years, indicating that the Rule is unlikely to be accepted.
35. The NASD announced in May 2004 that it had fined Bear Steams & Co., Inc., Morgan
Stanley & Co., and others for churning excessive fees on the day of the IPO for the accounts of
allocatees. See NASD, News Release, Charges Invemed Associates with Sharing in Customers' Profits
from Hot IPOs (Apr. 15,2003), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGET_
PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_002942. For example, a customer may be granted an opportunity to
buy hot IPO shares on a certain day, but during that day, the broker will buy and sell a liquid security
for the same customer and charge a fee of $100,000 instead of a $3000 fee.
36. See id. (describing how customers who received allocations of original IPO shares in hot
issues would then enter into a wash trade in a different liquid security, paying the brokerage firm
commissions up to six times the normal fee); NASD News Release, Thomas Weisel Partners to Pay
$1.75 Million to SettleNASD Charges of IPO, E-Mail Retention Violations (Mar. 30,2005), available
at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013698
(determining that Thomas Weisel Partners received excessively high commissions ($1 per share
compared to the normal six cents per share) on highly liquid trades within 24 hours of allocating hot
IPO shares to the same customers during 1999-2000). Cf NASD, News Release, Morgan Stanley to
Pay $2.7 Million for IPO Lock-Up Violations (June 9,2000), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/
idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_014346 (fining Morgan Stanley for
accepting IPO shares as fees, then violating NASD rules by selling shares for a profit before the
expiration of one year, resulting in an "excessive fee").
37. Probably one of the more famous examples publicized during Credit Suisse's Frank
Quattrone's trial was Quattrone's spinning of Corvis IPO shares to Michael Dell of Dell, Inc. in an
effort to gain investment banking business from that company. During trial, email correspondence was
entered into evidence in which Mr. Dell asked for IPO shares: "We would like 250[,000] shares of
Corvis. I know there have been efforts on both sides to build the relationship [between Dell Inc. and
CSFB] and an offering like this would certainly help." John Paczkowski, Get Yer Stinking Robotic
Paws Off Me, You Damn Dirty Robo-Ape, SiliconValley.com (Oct. 13, 2000),
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/business/columnists/gmsv/7004186.htm.
38. See National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), Notice to Members 02-55 (Aug.
2002), at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=-NASDW_
003491 (requesting comment on Proposed New Rule 2712 (IPO Allocations and Distributions)).
39. Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes by the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. and the National Association of Securities Dealers Relating to the Prohibition
of Certain Abuses in the Allocation and Distribution of Shares in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs),
Exchange Act Release No. 50,896,69 Fed. Reg. 77,804, 77,805 (Dec. 28,2004) (giving the text of the
second amendment to the proposed rule, which would prohibit allocating IPO shares to officers or
directors of companies that (1) have been investment banking customers in the past 12 months;
(2) may reasonably be investment banking customers within the next six months; or (3) in
consideration of an express or implied promise to be an investment banking customer).
Winter 2006]
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For most founders of start-up companies, letting investment banks and
institutional investors skim off the top of the total IPO pie is part of a very lucrative
deal for them. Many founders become amazingly wealthy in their IPOs, so they are
content to forego some portion of operating capital for the issuer.40 However, savvy
officers of seasoned companies are becoming disillusioned with the bookbuilding
process.4' Companies that eventually went bankrupt after going public during the
1999-2000 Boom are now in litigation with investment banks, alleging that
underpricing lost them much needed capital.42 But even with the excessively high
transaction costs of going public, few issuers have a viable alternative to the
bookbuilding system or the market power to forego Wall Street.43
2. Bookbuilding v. Auctions
Although bookbuilding is the most prevalent IPO mechanism, other countries
have used alternative methods. In Singapore, Finland, and the United Kingdom,
mechanisms can be used whereby underwriters announce an offering price and
investors submit demands for shares at that fixed price." Next, shares are allocated
to the bidders in a random fashion. This fixed price method alleviates the
discriminatory allocation problem inherent in bookbuilding; however, it does not
address the ability of the underwriter to underprice the shares.45 Without the ability
to parcel out underpriced shares to chosen recipients, underwriters might have less
incentive to underprice the shares.
Alternatively, IPO shares can be distributed through an open auction process
similar to processes used in Israel and France.46 In an Internet auction, bidders place
orders based on the number of shares that they would purchase at given prices. The
highest price at which all shares would be purchased becomes the offering price.47
Successful bidders are allocated shares based on the offering price, and if the
offering is oversubscribed at the offering price, then bidders receive a pro rata
40. John C. Coffee, Jr., The IPOAllocation Probe: Who is the Victim?, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 2001,
at 5 (noting that underwriting typically is a "cost imposed on capital formation, which accrues to
financial intermediaries").
41. See Shawn Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 84 (describing
billionaire H. Ross Perot as being "outraged" when institutional investors flipped shares of Perot
Systems after its 1999 offering for a $180 million profit). See also Coffee, supra note 40 (describing
as dysfunctional an IPO system that sees up to 75% of the market value of the IPO shares going to
either underwriters or institutional investors and not the issuer).
42. See John Caher, N.Y. High Court Imposes Fiduciary Duty on IPO Underwriter Goldman
Sachs, Law.com, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1118135115736.
43. Derrien & Womack, supra note 12, at 32 (stating that bookbuilding has dominated keeping
alternatives for IPOs from being tried).
44. Bruno Biais & Anne Marie Faugeron-Crouzet, IPO Auctions: English, Dutch, French, and
Internet, 11 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 9, 10 (2002).
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 10.
47. William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Internet Investment Banking: The Impact ofInformation Technology
on Relationship Banking, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 1999, available at
http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/chaplinskys/courses/GBUS-847/documents/intemetinvestment.pdf.
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allocation of shares.48 No shares would be pre-allocated to either individuals or
institutions.49
The underwriter will have no discretion or very little discretion in determining the
price of the IPO shares or the recipients of the distribution in the purest form of an
online auction.5" The highest bidders will be the recipients of the original IPO
shares, with some exceptions.51 Because the resulting offering price should reflect
the full demand for the IPO shares, the online auction process should lead to less
underpricing and theoretically a stable share price on the first day.52
Understandably, in the United States underwriters have not embraced online
IPOs 3 To do so would mean the end of a system that grants underwriters a
monopoly on IPO shares that are used to reward and entice selected recipients.
Generally, issuers choose an underwriter early in the IPO decision-making process,
and unless that underwriter is the one firm in the United States that offers online
IPOs, that underwriter is unlikely to counsel the issuer to investigate the pros and
cons of online IPOs. 4 If American underwriters recommended online IPOs, they
would not only be giving up some control of the underwriting process to another
underwriter, but they also would be giving up control of the allocation process, a
lucrative opportunity to use other people's capital to curry favor with other Wall
Street players.55 In addition, American underwriters may be loath to implement their
own online auction mechanisms and thereby eliminate an allocation system that
allows them to reward and entice their regular customers.
Attitudes of issuers may also create a stumbling block to change. Most new
issuers have few choices when negotiating with investment banks to underwrite their
IPOs. Although issuers may lose capital because of underpricing, the founders may
be satisfied with the profits realized by the new ability to sell their shares in the
secondary markets. 56 In addition, the founders of the IPO company may not want
to forego the potential upside of reserved directed shares for friends and family and
48. Biais & Faugeron-Crouzet, supra note 44, at 10.
49. WR Hambrecht+ Co., OpenlPO: Pro-RataAllocation, http://wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/
openipo/prorata.html (explaining the allocation of shares from the companies online auction).
50. See David Nicklaus, Google Auction May Ripple into the Future, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Aug. 20, 2004, at BI (discussing that outcome of auction-style IPO was to end "Wall Street placing
shares with friends and favored customers").
51. WRHambrecht + Co., OpenlPO: Pro-Rata Allocation, http://wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/
openipo/prorata.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
52. See Steve James, IPO View-WhatAm IBidfora Google DutchAuction?, REUTERS, Dec. 21,
2003, available at http://www.forbes.com/business/newswire/2003/12/21/rtr 1188718.html.
53. See generally John Gapper, Wall Street Is Wrong About Google, FIN. TIMEs (London), Aug.
12, 2004, at 17 (describing common complaints about Google's decision and implementation of an
online auction IPO).
54. CBS Marketwatch, The IPO Process for Companies, at
http://www.sharebuilder.com/about_us/articles/ipo/article2.htrn (last visited Oct. 8,2005) (discussing
that assembly of an "IPO team" is the first thing done).
55. See Nicklaus, supra note 50. See also Cornelli & Goidreich, supra note 23, at 2343-44
(describing allocation process in traditional bookbuilding as not following "an explicit rule").
56. SEC, Initial Public Offerings, Pricing Differences, at
http://www.sec.gov/answers/ipopricing.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2005) (describing the sometimes
"large" discrepancies between the IPO price and the share price when traded on the secondary market).
Winter 20061
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the ability to build in gain for themselves and their strategic partners. 57 Further,
founders often rely on venture capital firms (VCs) to choose investment banks, and
VCs also may be hesitant to forego instant profits. 58 Most frustratingly, founders
also find themselves recruited into this scheme whereby they allow their investment
bank to underprice shares of their company in return for the opportunity to receive
allocations in future hot IPOs from that bank.59
The other major Wall Street player involved in the IPO process, the institutional
investor, has also been spoiled by huge short-term gains, as have arbitrageurs and
day traders, and so will not be attracted to the online auction process. Ironically,
because the auction process may entail "winner's curse" problems, the share price
may actually decline the first day.6° Because the IPO process creates profitable
short-term opportunities for the professional investor, institutional investors will use
their consumer power to maintain the bookbuilding status quo.6' Unfortunately, the
main Wall Street players who profit from the American bookbuilding system are
also the persons who have the power to choose the IPO format, which will hamper
the growth of online IPOs.
Industry resistance aside, the availability of online IPO auction mechanisms
promises a more democratic IPO process whereby the larger public has the
opportunity to participate.62 Theoretically, the enhanced transparency of pricing and
participation of investors should create a more efficient market for IPOs because the
offering price will more accurately reflect the value investors place on the IPO
shares. Abolishing the bookbuilding method would transform the IPO process and
eliminate abusive profit allocations and other unfair practices such as spinning and
laddering.63 Although the SEC and the NASD refuse to prohibit these practices,
these practices would effectively disappear should online auctions proliferate and
flourish.
57. Many start-ups during the 1999-2000 Boom engaged in a fragile house of cards in which the
start-up would promise IPO allocations to executives of strategic partners in exchange for the strategic
partners entering into lucrative contracts with the start-up. These lucrative contracts were the basis
for the business plan on which the IPO was launched. See Hurt, supra note 30, at 745-48 (describing
one scenario involving Sycamore Networks and Williams Communications).
58. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation ofAnalysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1050 (2003) (noting that some venture capital firms
are even divisions of investment banking firms).
59. For example, eBay used Goldman Sachs as its lead underwriter in its 1998 IPO, and seven
directors of eBay accepted IPO allocations from Goldman in over 200 offerings between 1998 and
2001 that were worth millions of dollars to those directors. See In re eBay, Inc. S'holders Litig., No.
C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at * 1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23,2004) (detailing claims of shareholders that
the directors receiving IPO shares breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to eBay shareholders by
usurping a corporate opportunity).
60. David A. Vise, Google Launches Auction: Playboy Interview Won't Delay IPO, WASH.
POST, Aug. 14, 2004, at E 1 ("Google has warned that there may be a 'winner's curse' as a result of the
auction process-meaning that the share price could fall on the first day of trading if the blind auction
succeeds in maximizing the initial price, leaving successful bidders with a paper loss on day one.").
61. See generally Gapper, supra note 53 (recognizing the advantages to professionals of the
current bookbuilding system).
62. See Nicklaus, supra note 50; Comelli & Goldreich, supra note 23, at 2343-44.
63. Although the SEC and the NASD refuse to prohibit these practices, these practices would
effectively disappear should online auctions proliferate and flourish.
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B. The SEC and Online Auctions
Technically, a true IPO online auction would violate federal securities laws.'
SEC rules prohibit both selling and offering to sell securities before the issuer's
registration statement for those securities becomes effective.65 The registration
statement for a security cannot become effective until the final price is indicated by
the issuer." In an online auction, bidders make binding offers to buy shares, and the
seller accepts these offers at the highest price at which all shares will be sold. This
process sets the final price. Therefore, in a pure online auction, the final price
cannot be determined before buyers must make unconditional bids for the securities
and those bids are unconditionally accepted by the seller. Beginning in 1999,
investment banks have asked the SEC to issue no-action letters confirming that
online auctions would not run afoul of SEC offerings rules.67
The SEC issued its first no-action letter to Wit Capital Corporation, the first
online investment bank, in July 1999. 61 The letter stated that Wit Capital could sell
shares in an online initial public offering; however, bids from prospective buyers
would be considered mere "indications of interest" and bids would remain open until
48 hours before the registration statement would become effective. 69 At that time,
Wit Capital would send emails to all bidders to reconfirm their bids, at which time
the bids would become offers.7" Wit Capital would then determine the winning
price of IPO shares and submit a price amendment to the SEC.7" Next, after the
registration statement became effective, Wit Capital would then accept the highest
offers. The process described in the Wit Capital letter was an amalgam of a pure
online auction and the bookbuilding process. For example, Wit Capital disclosed
that it would reserve the right to set aside directed shares that could then be allocated
to "employees or customers of the issuer or other persons with an affinity
relationship with the issuer. 72 Also, Wit Capital indicated that it would allocate no
more than 100 shares to any bidder until all winning bidders had been allocated 100
shares. Other innovative investment banks, which had emerged during the
technology boom, followed suit.73
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2005).
65. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 5-7.
66. See id. (citing Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1013585, at * 1 (July 20,
2000)).
67. See Bears, Steams & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 748, at * 1 (July
20, 2000); Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 498545, at * 1 (July 14, 1999)
[hereinafter 1999 Wit Capital Letter].
68. See Wit Capital Corp., 1999 WL 498545, at *1.
69. Id. at *23.
70. Id. at *84 0 (discussing generally how the confirmation process will work through email).71. Id. at *6, * 17.
72. Id. at *7.
73. See, e.g., W.R. Hambrecht+ Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 987735, at *1-2 (July 12,
2000) (seeking guidance for the online issuance of debt securities). Even traditional investment banks
began making plans for online securities platforms. See Bear, Steams & Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
2000 WL 1013584, at * 1 (July 20, 2000) (seeking guidance for the online issuance of investment-grade
debt securities).
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In 2000, Wit Capital requested a second no-action letter to extend its auction
mechanism to include follow-on and secondary offerings that would be priced and
distributed in a Dutch auction format.74 However, Wit Capital failed to specify
whether the revised format would also be used in connection with IPOs. 75 In the
proposed Dutch offering, bidders would bid for shares between a given maximum
bid price and a minimum bid price. 76 The offering price would then be set at the
clearing price, the highest price for which all shares would be sold up to the
maximum bid price." If the offering was oversubscribed at the offering price, then
the issuer would allocate the shares to the bidders based strictly on the highest bids
and the time of each bid. 7' Thus, the online auction would be truly transparent,
allowing any Internet user to view the aggregate demand in the auction at any price
point. Additionally, each bidder would have the ability to change or cancel bids
prior to the termination of the auction.7 9 Although the bids would be anonymous,
the issuer and the underwriter could agree to adjust the allocation to ensure that
either small bidders or large bidders, or both, would receive at least 25% of the
allocation.8"
Although several investment firms created infrastructure to offer equity securities
and debt securities in an online auction process, most, including Wit Capital,
abandoned the practice after the end of the 1999-2000 Boom. Ironically, the firms
most likely to want to go public via an online auction, technology firms and web-
based businesses, were the very firms hit hardest by bursting of the technology
bubble and the least likely to go public in large numbers for some time. Although
only one of the companies at the forefront of online IPOs remains active in that
industry, pioneers such as Wit Capital helped create a regulatory atmosphere
permitting IPO auctions.
C. W.R. Hambrecht + Co.
Most traditional brokerage firms accept electronic orders for IPO shares from
individuals. However, few brokerage firms have developed a system whereby all
original [PO shares can be distributed via an Internet auction. Furthermore, of the
firms that developed online auction systems during the 1999-2000 Boom, only W.R.
Hambrecht + Co. currently maintains an online [PO auction platform."1 After 40
years in traditional investment banking at his own firm, Hambrecht & Quist, W.R.
Hambrecht spoke publicly about the abuses of the IPO process and thereafter started
a new investment banking firm, W.R. Hambrecht + Co. (hereinafter Hambrecht).12
74. See Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1013585, at *1 (July 20, 2000)
[hereinafter 2000 Wit Capital Letter].
75. See id.
76. See id. at *3.
77. See id. at *3-4.
78. See id. at *4.
79. See id. at *3.
80. See id. at *4.
81. See WR Hambrecht + Co.,Auctions and Offerings, at http://wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/
index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
82. See generally Frontline, Interview: Bill Hambrecht, available at
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Prior to the Google auction, Hambrecht launched ten companies, including Red
Envelope and Peet's Coffee & Tea, over five years using an online IPO auction
process called OpenlPO.83 In 2004, the year that Google went public, only one other
firm, New River Pharmaceuticals, Inc., used the OpenIPO platform for its IPO. Two
firms, Genitope Corp. and Red Envelope, Inc., used the online auction format for
their 2002 IPOs, and Overstocks.com used OpenIPO when it went public in 2001.
As these numbers suggest, very few companies had launched online IPOs prior to
Google's IPO, barely one or two a year.8 Many of these companies are creatures
of the Internet, like Red Envelope and Overstocks.com, or companies with a
reputation for nonconformity, like Peet's Coffee & Tea. 5
D. IPO Advisory Committee and the NASD
On August 22, 2002, Harvey Pitt, the now former SEC Chairman, asked Dick
Grasso, then New York Stock Exchange Chairman, and, Robert R. Glauber, then
NASD Chairman, to convene a committee of leaders in both the business and
academic communities to assess problems in the IPO process.8 6 Pitt and Grasso
formed the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee ("Committee") to focus on why
IPO prices would increase dramatically at the beginning of an offering and how this
phenomenon contributed to aggressive, possibly illegal, underwriting practices. In
May 2003, the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee released a document entitled
"Report and Recommendations," detailing the Committee's recommendations on
how to restore integrity to the IPO process.8 7
Although the Committee's report does not denounce the bookbuilding process, 8
the Committee recognized that investors had lost confidence in the IPO market due
to the "widespread perception that IPOs are parceled out disproportionately to a few,
favored investors, be they large institutions, powerful individuals or 'friends and
family' of the issuer."8 9 However, although the report supports alternatives to
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/interviewslhambrecht.html (quoting
Hambrecht as saying, "Instead of a situation where you're hired as an underwriter to place the stock
with people who are going to be the long-term shareholders, when you get into volatile hot markets
where you get this unusual first-day trading profits, there's a tremendous propensity to give that stock
to your best client. And they in turn sell it and take a quick profit, and then the long-term buyer, the
guy you wanted in the first place, ends up buying it in the volatile aftermarket.").
83. See WR Hambrecht + Co., Recent Offerings, athttp://www.wrhambrecht.com/comp/corpfin/
completed recent.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2005) (listing the tombstones of completed online initial
public offerings).
84. Hambrecht, Recent Offerings, supra note 83.
85. See generally Eric A. Taub, Rival Moving Beyond Roots Entwined with Starbucks, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2005, at C4 (quoting a Peet's aficionado as saying that she preferred Peet's to Starbucks
partly because "it's not part of an evil empire").
86. See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A
COMMTrrEE CONVENED BY THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. AND NASD AT THE REQUEST OF
THE U.S. SECURrrIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMIssION app. A (May 2003), available at
http://www.nyse.corn/pdfs/iporeport.pdf.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 9 (stating the conclusion of the Committee that although auction should be
supported by the SEC, that bookbuilding should not be eliminated or disfavored).
89. See id. at 2.
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bookbuilding, such as Dutch auctions, the report clearly states that the Committee
did not believe that bookbuilding was "inherently flawed" or that regulations should
eliminate or even disfavor the traditional bookbuilding method. 9° Instead, the
Committee recommended that the market should determine the dominant method
of IPO distribution. 9'
III. THE GOOGLE AUCTION
At a time when most industry-watchers had forgotten about online IPOs, Google
announced that it intended to launch its highly anticipated IPO in an online auction
format.
A. Google, the Company
In some ways, Google Inc. is a typical dot.com company that emerged during the
1990s technology boom as one of the many start-ups created by two smart kids with
a great idea. By 1998, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, who met while students at
Stanford, raised $1 million in angel investor money to launch their own search
engine to compete with Yahoo, Lycos, and Altavista.92 This search engine, known
as Google, markets itself as the search engine that retrieves the most relevant
webpages based on user's search terms.93 By design or sheer luck, Google did not
go public during the 1999-2000 Boom, although many technology companies with
little or no record of earnings did choose to go public during that time, only to
eventually fail. In fact, several search engine companies failed during this time or
underwent massive restructuring.94  However, Google remained private and
continued to prosper and is now both the pre-eminent search engine website and the
fifth most popular website in the world.95
Internet users can, harness the power of Google's search engine at no cost, so
Google depends on advertising for revenue.96 Google's AdWords program
generates sidebar ads for vendors based on a user's search terms on the Google
90. Id. at I n.1, 9.
91. Id. at 9.
92. Google Milestones, at http://www.google.com/intl/en/corporate/history.html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2005).
93. For a thorough examination of Internet word search providers, see generally Eric Goldman,
Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 511 (2005).
94. Lycos was sold twice, once in 2000 to Terra Networks, S.A., and again in 2004 to Daum
Communications Corporation. Jung-A Song, Saturation Drives Daum to Buy Lycos: Acquisition
Underlines Ambitions ofSouth KoreanInternet Companies, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 3,2004, at 23.
Altavista's parent was bought by Compaq, which spun off Altavista stock in 1999. CMGI Files to
Spin Off Altavista, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 19, 1999. Altavista was eventually bought by Overture
Services, Inc., which was then bought by Yahoo in 2004. Michael Bazeley, How Yahoo Boosted its
Revenue, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 11, 2005.
95. Google, Quick Profile, at http://www.google.com/corporate/facts.html (last visited Sept. 7,
2005).
96. Google, Company Overview, at http://www.google.coni/corporate/index.html (last visited
Sept. 8, 2005).
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website.97 A portion of Google's ad revenue is based on the number of users who
click on the sidebar ads.9" Google also maintains a network of "thousands of third-
party websites" that use Google's AdSense program to generate ads on their own
websites. 99 Altogether, 95% of Google's revenue is derived in some way from
advertising.'00
B. Waiting for Google: Anticipating the Auction
In 2004, nothing captured the imagination of Wall Street like the announcement
by Larry Page and Sergey Brin that not only would Google finally participate in a
public offering but also that the public offering would be executed via an online
auction.'0 ' The founders explained that this auction would embody both the
innovative mindset and democratic spirit of Google.1
0 2
1. Google 's Registration Statement
In Google's April 29, 2004 registration statement, the founders departed from the
traditional S-I format to write a letter to investors explaining that Google would be
different from other public companies.0 3 First, the founders explained that they
chose an online IPO auction format because they felt that the inefficiencies inherent
in the traditional IPO process were damaging to both the issuer and the long-term
investor.' °4 Similarly, the founders warned potential investors that the company was
not interested in hitting short term financial benchmarks at the expense of long-term
productivity. Thus, short-term investors would be disappointed with the auction
process, which might result in no share price increase the first day of trading.
Ultimately, the founders urged only long-term investment in their company.0 5
Despite Google's efforts to use its auction to demonstrate how the company was
different from other technology companies, critics were quick to point out that
Google's auction process was not a true Dutch auction.10' In a true Dutch auction,
anyone may bid, and the clearing price determines the offering price.0 7 At first
blush, Google's auction did not seem democratic. First, Google chose two
97. Google, Quick Profile, supra note 95.
98. Google, Company Overview, supra note 96.
99. See Google, Corporate Profile, http://investor.google.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
100. Eric Hellweg, A Reaction to Google's IPO: Buy Yahoo!, CNN MONEY, May 1, 2004, at
http://money.cnn.com/2004/04/30/technology/techinvestor/hellweg/.
101. Review & Outlook: Google's Dutch Treat, WALL. ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A20 [hereinafter
Dutch Treat].
102. Id. ("In a sense, this auction is the perfect IPO expression of Google's own business model.
The company's success has derived from its ability to democratize access to information via the
Internet, and its auction will likewise open its shares to a wide spectrum of investors.").
103. Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at i (Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Form S-l],
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/dsl.htm.
104. Id. at v.
105. Id.
106. Eugene Choo, Going Dutch: The Google IPO, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 428 (2005).
107. Id. at 414 (citing Paul Milgrim, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 6-7
(1989)).
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traditional underwriters for its auction, Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse First
Boston.'08 These investment banks were not known for IPO innovation and had
never offered an online IPO auction before. All other IPO auctions in the United
States had been handled through W.R. Hambrecht + Co. 9 Second, to participate
in the auction, prospective investors were required to open an account with one of
these two finns."' To ensure that only serious bidders participated in the auction,
these firms required prospective investors to maintain extremely high minimum
balances in their accounts and to be adjudged "accredited investors.. ' .' The rumors
flew that to create a qualifying account at one of these firms would require a balance
of $1 million." 2
2. First Amendment to the Registration Statement
In response to the criticism surrounding Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse, the
first amendment to the registration statement filed on May 21, 2004 (hereinafter first
amendment), added twenty-nine additional banks as underwriters, including smaller
banks and online banks, such as E*Trade." 3  The twenty-nine additional
underwriters included traditional Wall Street firms such as Merrill Lynch and
Goldman Sachs, who were in the uncommon position of being part of a large
syndicate without being named as co-lead underwriters." 4 The addition of these
firms seemed to open up the bidding to a larger number of investors as many of the
smaller banks required only a $2000 minimum account balance. However, as the
registration process continued, several larger banks dropped out and were omitted
in subsequent registration statement amendments." 5 For example, Merrill Lynch
reportedly dropped out after estimating that it would lose money on the effort. 6
The first amendment to the registration statement also contained five pages that
detailed the risks inherent in the auction process." 7 In any auction, a winner may
be said to experience the "winner's curse" because an auction winner by definition
108. Form S-I, supra note 103, at 96.
109. Choo, supra note 106, at 417.
110. Form S-I, supra note 103, at 25.
111. Id. at 26 (noting that "due to each underwriter's requirements ... you may not be able to open
an account").
112. John E. Fitzgibbon, Jr., Passing Parade: Google Hype vs. History, at
http://www. 123jump.com/story/Passing-Parade:-Google-Hype-Vs.-History/14842/ipo/Google (last
visited Sept. 19, 2005).
113. Google, Inc., Amendment No. Ito Registration Statement (Form S- 1), at 25 (May 21, 2004)
[hereinafter Amendment No. 1], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/0001
19312504093053/dsla.htm.
114. Id. at 94 (noting that Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse acted as representatives for the other
underwriters).
115. See, e.g., Google, Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statement (Form S-1) (July 26,
2004) [hereinafter Amendment No. 4], available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504124025/ds 1 a.htm (showing a total
number of underwriters had reduced to 28).
116. See Bill Deener, Google 1PO May Not Live Up to Its Hype, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.
8, 2004, at ID (hypothesizing that Google's demand to reduce underwriting fees from seven percent
to three percent drove Merrill Lynch out of the underwriting syndicate).
117. Amendment No. 1, supra note 113, at 18-22.
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values the product at an amount higher than anyone else."' In an IPO auction,
because the auction price will be the highest price that anyone has offered to pay,
the price may indeed decline over the offering's first few days in the secondary
market." 9 To an unsophisticated investor, the first-day pop may reflect the
increasing value of a company. Therefore, if now-defunct issuers, such as
Webvan, 20 could see their share prices double in the first day of an offering, then
the share price of a seasoned company like Google should double, or even triple.
However, because the online auction format is designed to capture the demand buzz
in the auction price, not in the first day closing price, that pop should not happen.
Knowing that some investors would want to participate in the Google IPO in order
to experience a big, first-day "pop," Google management tried to inoculate the
market from that disappointment. ' 2
The first amendment identified another risk in an attempt to ward off post-auction
backlash: the risk that the auction process might actually hurt Google's brand
instead of enhance it. 1' Therefore, Google warned that "[s]hould either the auction
structure fail or users get frustrated with the process, then that negative public
reception could reflect badly on Google products."'2 3
3. Second Amendment to the Registration Statement
Although the first amendment warned investors about the risk of share prices
deflating due to a "lower level of participation by professional long-term investors
and a higher level of participation by retail investors," the second amendment to the
registration statement (hereinafter second amendment) more explicitly warned
investors about the winner's curse phenomenon and the possibility that
unsophisticated bidders might artificially drive the offering price. The second
amendment added a new risk factor that addressed the possibility that "less price
sensitive investors" would drive the auction clearing price beyond the true market
value of the shares.'24 Google warned prospective investors that a large number of
unsophisticated investors with brand awareness of Google but lack of access to
extensive research and analysis could drive the price above the fundamental value
of a Google share. 25 Not only might the share price not increase dramatically
118. Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 339, 421 n.376 (1998).
119. Amendment No. 1, supra note 113, at 18.
120. Webvan, an online grocery delivery service, went public in November 1999, and its shares
climbed 73% in its first day of trading. However, such euphoria was short-lived as Webvan declared
bankruptcy on July 13, 2001. See Jenny Strasburg, Five Years After the Bubble Popped; NASDAQ up
85% since Nadir in 2002, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 10, 2005, at C1.
121. Amendment No. 1, supra note 113, at 18 ("Therefore, buyers hoping to capture profits shortly
after our Class A common stock begins trading may be disappointed.").
122. Id. at 19 ("The systems and procedures used to implement our auction and the results of our
auction could harm our business and our brand.").
123. Id. at 18-19.
124. Google, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form S-I), at 19-20 (June 21,
2004) [hereinafter Amendment No. 2], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/
000119312504105564/dsla.htm.
125. Id.
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during the first day, but it also might decrease. The second amendment warned that
"the offering price of our shares may have little or no relationship to the price that
would be established using traditional indicators of value.... As a result, [the] initial
public offering price may not be sustainable.' '26
The second amendment also discussed the topic of the selling of insider shares.
Google management emphasized that Page and Brin were the only Google insiders
contractually obligated to hold their shares once the offering was underway.' In
other words, the high volume of shares held by other Google insiders were not
subject to the usual lock-up agreement required by most underwriters. In most
IPOs, the underwriter requires insiders to hold their shares for a certain number of
days, typically 90 or 180 days.128 Because the sale of a large amount of shares on
a given day can drive the share price down, the underwriter uses lock-up agreements
to maintain a high share price for as long as possible. The underwriter can waive
the lock-up requirement at any time and regularly does so if the share price remains
high.'29 Conversely, if the share price plummets, the underwriter may ask insiders
to extend lock-up terms to stave off a price decrease. 3 Arguably, this type of
underwriter price management is manipulative and inefficient; therefore, Google
stressed that an unrestricted system would make the system more transparent. 3 '
However, Page and Brin themselves "entered into contractual lock-up agreements
with our officers and directors and certain of our employees and other security
holders.' 3' Allowing the other insiders to sell their large numbers of pre-IPO shares
at their discretion roused criticism. 113 Many critics thought that Google
management, in a role similar to an underwriter, could then manage the stock price
through pressuring employees and relatives to hold or sell. 13
4. Fourth Amendment to the Registration Statement
By the fourth amendment (hereinafter fourth amendment), Google management
had compromised on the issue of lock-up agreements and described the details of
an agreement between Google and holders of restricted securities that would
gradually allow more insider shares to become available for sale after 15, 90, 120,
126. Id. at 20.
127. Id. at 107.
128. Deborah A. Marshall, Latest Trends with Lock-ups and Other Underwriting Arrangements,
in SECURITIES REGULATION 2000, at 363,367 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. B0-
0OLK, 2000).
129. Fisch & Sale, supra note 58, at 1050-51 (explaining that the realistic length of a lockup
agreement is entirely within the discretion of the underwriter, who can unilaterally waive the lockup
agreement).
130. See Marshall, supra note 128, at 387.
131. Brett Cole, Hambrecht Wants Firm to Go Public, SEATTLE T"lIES, Aug. 27, 2004, at D3.
132. Amendment No. 2, supra note 124, at 120.
133. Verne Kopytoff, Unusual Lock-up Could Hurt Price; Short Freeze, Big Release for Google
Insiders, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24, 2004, at Cl.
134. Deborah Lohse & Michael Bazeley, Google Debut Losing Luster, SAN JOSE MERCURYNEWS,
Aug. 8, 2004, at Al (noting that pre-IPO, three times as many shares were held by Google insiders than
in an average IPO).
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150, and 180 days. 11 5 Even after this disclosure, Google admitted that the short
duration of "the selling restriction agreements between us and our stockholders will
allow significantly more shares to become freely tradeable soon after completion of
the offering than is typical of initial public offerings." '136 Accordingly, analysts were
unimpressed with the details of this agreement, noting that according to Thomson
Financial, no IPO in the last two years was launched without insiders agreeing to a
lock-up period of at least 180 days.'37 The head of one Wall Street firm complained
that allowing insiders to sell their shares so quickly was inconsistent with Google
management's expressed focus on long-term investing. 3 ' Further, analysts feared
that the large amount of outstanding pre-IPO stock available for sale would
eventually dilute the share price.139 However, because this risk was outlined in the
Google disclosure documents, other analysts noted that the information on the lock-
up restrictions would discount the share price, so that the eventual sale of insider
stock should not affect the share price. 40 This confidence in the market's efficiency
was not good news to Google management, however, who would not want the
market to discount its IPO shares when bidding during the auction.
The fourth amendment's biggest surprise was the estimated price range for the
original IPO shares. The company estimated that the offering price would be
between $108 and $135 per share.141 U.S. auctions generally do list a range of
prices, but this range seemed extremely high to many analysts.'42 Obviously, the
share price is irrelevant without taking into account the number of shares
outstanding, but most IPOs in the United States are priced much lower to increase
liquidity, usually no more than $20 or $30 per share. 14 3 If Google priced in this
estimated range, it would be ranked as the second highest IPO offering share price
of all time. 144 Analysts speculated that the high price range was designed to keep
out the rabble. 145 Google and the underwriters were concerned about the volume of
interest, particularly unsophisticated interest, that might destroy the integrity of the
auction process.'46 If the offering price were sufficiently high and brokers required
the purchase of a minimum number of shares, then only serious bidders would
participate in the offering. Of course, the price could also have reflected the issuer's
135. Amendment No. 4, supra note 115, at 110-11.
136. Id. at 23.
137. Gregory Zuckerman, Some Big Investors to Sit Out Google Auction, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
2004, at Cl.
138. Id.
139. Kathleen Pender, Google Fumbled a Good Idea, S.F. CHRoN, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al.
140. Dawn Kawamoto, Potential Flood of Insider Sales Hangs Over Some Stocks, CNET
News.com, June 2, 2000, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1017-241382.html?legacy=cnet.
141. Amendment No. 4, supra note 115, at 1.
142. Allan Sloan, IPO's Success Doesn't Justify Google's Price, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2004, at
E3.
143. See Russ Wiles, IPOfor Google Not Democratic on 2nd Viewing, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix),
Aug. 18, 2004, at D5 (stating that out of 160 IPOs in the twelve months prior to the Google IPO, only
4 IPOs opened with an offering price over $25, and none of those prices were above $30).
144. See id. (noting that no IPO in recent memory opened with a three-digit price).
145. Kevin J. Delaney & Ruth Simon, Deals & Deal Makers: Google's IPO Draws Lukewarm
Interest From Small Investors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2004, at CI ("Google may have set a high share
price estimate to dampen interest among individuals.").
146. Id.
Winter 20061
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
sense of the market demand for shares at that time. If Google management believed
that the price would rise to this level in the first few days of the offering, a common
occurrence during the 1999-2000 Boom, then setting the range this high would
ensure that the market demand would be captured by the issuer, not the resellers. 147
The fourth amendment also detailed that Google planned on selling 24,636,659
total shares, of which 10,494,524 would be shares currently issued and owned by
Google stockholders.'48 Specifically, given the $105-135 per share range, Google
stood to net as much as $1.6 billion from the sale if the shares priced at the
midpoint. 149 If the high price range truly reflected the high demand for Google
shares, then both Google and Google's insiders would capture that demand.
Specifically, Brin, who was planning on selling 962,226 shares, and Page, who
planned to sell 964,83 0 shares, would pocket roughly $13 0 million each at the $135
offering price. 5o Notably, these shares constituted less than 3% of either Brin's or
Page's holdings in the company.' Pricea at this range, the underwriters would
share more than $90 million in fees at the unprecedented discount rate that Google
had negotiated: 3%, compared with the industry-wide 7%.
5. The August Slump
In August 2004, critics speculated that demand for Google shares was waning.
The high price range of $108-135 seemed destined for a fall as the registration
process continued.' 52 Institutional investors grew lukewarm on the offering as they
found themselves in the unfamiliar and unenviable role of having to bid against
retail investors in an auction that likely would not produce any short-term gains.'53
Because institutional investors were accustomed to receiving pre-allocated IPO
shares and then selling them in the next few days at a profit, the Google IPO was not
attractive to many institutional investors.'54 In addition, these institutional investors
had a vested interest in seeing this auction experiment fail, and with it, any challenge
to the status quo of bookbuilding offerings.'
Faced early on with the specter of irrational retail investors crowding out
institutional investors, Google may have attempted to dampen individual investor
demand by setting the share price high and by issuing doomsday-like warnings in
147. Aaron Lucchetti et al., With Eyes for Google, 3 Investors Ride a 111-Day Roller Coaster,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2004, at Al.
148. Amendment No. 4, supra note 115, at 1.
149. Id. at 43.
150. Id. at99.
151. Id.
152. See Gregory Zuckerman, Google Shares Prove Big Winners-for a Day, WALL ST. J., Aug.
20, 2004, at Cl.
153. See Lucchetti et al., supra note 147 (describing how a hedge fund manager felt some concern
at being forced to "fly blind like everybody else" instead of being able to "bully underwriters
overseeing the deals into giving them a healthy cut of shares before they start trading").
154. Id. Investment guru James Cramer advised investors that the Google offering would suffer
an initial slump because "[i]nstitutions, mutual funds and hedge funds are boycotting the deal."
Cramer advised buying shares during the post-IPO slump. Id.
155, Global Agenda, Google's 1PO Rollercoaster, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfn?storyid=3103916.
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its registration statement.'56 These tactics appeared to work too well as retail
investors seemed wary of the Google auction and the high share price range.
57
Further, the description of the auction process may have been daunting to retail
investors, who would have to register with both Google and a participating
brokerage finn. This two-step process, discussed in section H.C., infra, may have
frightened away as many retail investors as did the high price range.'58
Other factors added to the Google auction backlash in addition to the labyrinthine
auction process and lofty price range. Some commentators opined that Google was
losing its competitive edge over Yahoo, with its share of the search market destined
to fall. ' Relatedly, Google had settled a patent infringement suit brought by Yahoo
in August for $300 million worth of stock. 60 Even Google's new email product,
Gmail, was being criticized for raising privacy concerns.' At the same time,
computer giant Microsoft was also developing its own search product, which would
challenge Google's market dominance.'62 With that announcement, Wall Street
speculated that growth in the Internet-search sector was slowing. 163 In fact, the
NASDAQ, 164 the listing choice for many technology companies, was down 15%
from January 2004.165 Furthermore, August, typically a vacation month, 166 is
traditionally a slow month for stocks and for IPOs. 67 Perhaps because of this trend,
in the two weeks leading up to Google's offering, ten other IPOs were cancelled.
68
The registration process also hit some marketing snags in August 2004. First,
Google's road show was getting negative reviews. 169 Besides receiving very little
financial information, investors were put off by the dual classes of stock, which gave
156. See Delaney & Simon, supra note 145 (citing an example of a first-time stock investor who
had declined to buy Google shares after the $108-135 range was announced).
157. Id. (citing an example of a first-time stock investor who had declined to buy Google shares
after the $108-135 range was announced).
158. See Lucchetti et al., supra note 147 (quoting an individual investor who ultimately decided
not to invest because of the cumbersome bidding process as saying, "'It seemed like every day there
was something new we had to do. I didn't feel like I had the time."').
159. See Google 's IPO Rollercoaster, supra note 155; Dutch Treat, supra note 101 (remarking
on the threat of competition from Yahoo and Microsoft).
160. See Google's IPO Rollercoaster, supra note 155.
161. See id.
162. Pete Barlas, Google Bidders Grapple with its Valuation, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Aug. 2,
2004, at A4 (quoting an analyst as saying if "Microsoft is spending a boatload of money on search,"
then "the valuation [of Google] goes down").
163. See, e.g., Google 's IPO Rollercoaster, supra note 155; David A. Vise, Bidding Opens New
Chapter for Tech 'God' Google, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2004, at El.
164. NASDAQ was the world's first electronic stock market and is now the largest in the United
States. It was originally an acronym for the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotations. NASDAQ, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasdaq (last visited Sept. 2, 2005).
165. See Google 's IPO Rollercoaster, supra note 155.
166. See Lucchetti et al., supra note 147 (quoting a mutual fund manager who never believed that
the IPO would take place because "in August 'everyone has gone to Nantucket or the Hamptons"').
167. Olga Kharif, Tech IPOs Are Clicking Again, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, SEPT. 12,2005, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2005/tc20050912_8768 tc024.htm.
168. Knowledge Wharton, Lessons From Google's IPO (Aug. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.altassets.com/knowledgebank/learningcurve/2004/nz5374.php.
169. Pete Barlas, Google 's Glitch Likely to Delay Launch of IPO, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Aug.
9, 2004, at A4.
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B class holders, Google insiders, ten votes per share. 7° Second, some retail
investors were frustrated by certain underwriters' restrictions on bids and rejection
of accounts due to suitability concerns. 7'
6. Seventh Amendment to the Registration Statement
Amid negative press focusing on everything from the auction to Google's
business plan to the tech industry as a whole, the bidding process was scheduled to
begin on August 13th. Unfortunately, one more shoe would drop before the auction
opened, and it would drop in a plain brown wrapper. On August 12th, a new issue
of Playboy magazine hit newsstands, complete with a seven-page interview with
Page and Brin. 172 Although Page and Brin gave the interview before the filing of the
registration statement in April, investors became concerned that the release of the
Playboy interview during the quiet period could cause regulatory problems.
73
During the quiet period, an issuer cannot speak publicly about the offering,"74 yet in
the Playboy article, the spokesmen for the issuer were definitely talking. On August
13th, after management discussed the Playboy risk with the SEC, Google filed its
seventh amendment to the registration statement (hereinafter seventh amendment),
in which management disclosed as a risk the fact that the Playboy interview could
create liability for Google for violating the SEC quiet period.
71
7. Friday the 13th-Bidding Begins
All of these negative factors together assured that bidding would not open with
a bang. In fact, the bidding opened slowly on Friday, August 13th. Google's
prospectus detailed the auction process and described its five stages:
(1) qualification, (2) bidding, (3) auction closing, (4) pricing, and (5) allocation. 76
The first step, the qualification of prospective bidders, ended on August 12th. Prior
to the start of the bidding process, any investor who wished to bid on Google's IPO
shares was required to complete the registration process. Registration included not
only applying for a bidder identification number at a Google website,
www.ipo.google.com, but also opening a qualifying account at a participating
170. See Matt Kranz, Whiz Kids" Blunders Blacken IPO's Eye, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 2004, at
BI.
171. See Michael J. Martinez, Despite Billing, Google IPO Isn't Just For Anybody, SEATLE
TIMES, Aug. 12,2004, at El [hereinafter Martinez, Despite Billing] (describing Ameritrade's extensive
questionnaire that resulted in the reporter's not being eligible, presumably because of a low net liquid
worth).
172. David Sheff, Google Guys, PLAYBOY, Sept. 2004, at 55.
173. Google, Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Registration Statement (Form S- 1), at 22 (Aug. 13, 2004)
[hereinafter Amendment No. 7], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/0001
19312504139655/dsla,htm.
174. 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (2005).
175. Amendment No. 7, supra note 173, at 21.
176. Id. at34-41.
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investment firm.' The beginning of the second step, bidding, began August
13th.
78
C. Google on the Auction Block: The Auction Arrives
Once the bidding process started, bidders could submit bids to any of the twenty-
eight underwriters listed in the seventh amendment via Internet, telephone, fax, or
hand delivery. 179  When bidders submitted their bids, they agreed to accept
electronic delivery of all notices concerning the auction process.' Bidders were
able to change or withdraw bids during the bidding process, but management
reserved the right to change the amount of shares sold and the price range
throughout the bidding process. The prospectus specifically warned that "[i]t is very
likely that the number of shares offered will increase if the price range increases."''
Additionally, the prospectus explained that in the event of a change in the price
range or the number of shares offered, Google would post a notice on its website,
issue a press release, and send an electronic notice to all bidders without requiring
bidders to reconfirm their bids.8 2 The prospectus also cautioned that once bidding
began, the auction could be closed at any time. However, bidders did have the right
to withdraw bids after the closing of the auction, if the bids had not been accepted.
Bidders would be notified both when Google requested that the SEC declare the
registration statement effective and when the effectiveness was declared.'83
Once the registration statement was declared effective, the pricing process would
begin. 84 The prospectus stated that the issuer retained the right to reject bids that
could potentially be manipulative, 8 5 and the issuers did reject some low-ball bids,
but not others. 186 All bids not rejected were then used to determine the "clearing
price," the highest price at which all of the shares offered would be sold. 87 In a true
Dutch auction, the clearing price is also the offering price. In the Google offering,
the issuers stated their intention to use the clearing price as the "principal factor" in
setting the IPO price, but retained the right to set the offering price below the
177. Amendment No. 4, supra note 115, at 41.
178. Saul Hansell, Google Ready to Take Bids But Now Questions Arise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2004, at C2.
179. Amendment No. 7, supra note 173, at 35-36.
180. Id. at 36.
181. Id. at 37.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 38.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 36 ("We, in consultation with our underwriters, will have the ability to reject bids that
have the potential to manipulate or disrupt the bidding process. These bids include bids that we, in
consultation with our underwriters, believe in our sole discretion do not reflect the number of shares
that you actually intend to purchase, or a series of bids that we, in consultation with our underwriters,
consider disruptive to the auction process.").
186. A Wall Street researcher bid $2 a share, which prompted a phone call from one of the
underwriters asking him to confirm the price. That bid was ultimately'rejected, but bids for $5 and $10
from the same bidder were accepted. Kevin J. Delaney, Gregory Zuckerman & Robin Sidel, Google
Is Allowed to Continue Along Its Bumpy Road to IPO by Issuing Revised SEC Filing, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 16, 2004, at C 1.
187. Amendment No. 7, supra note 173, at 38.
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auction clearing price. The stated reason for this reservation was to create a broader
distribution of shares and "to potentially reduce the downward price volatility in the
trading price of our shares in the period shortly following our offering."' 88 In other
words, Google reserved the right to underprice below market demand, which could
be beneficial if a winner's curse phenomenon occurred."8 9
After the offering price was determined, then Google would accept successful
bids by sending electronic notices to those bidders. If the offering price was below
the price range or more than 20% above the price range, Google would send an
electronic notice to bidders, who would then have one hour to withdraw bids before
acceptance. 190
1. Eighth Amendment to the Registration Statement
While registered bidders were making bids and adjusting them, yet another
management misstep was revealed. Google filed its eighth amendment (hereinafter
eighth amendment) on August 16, 2004. The eighth amendment disclosed for the
first time that Google was being investigated by the SEC and state regulators for
large numbers of unregistered shares and options for shares that the company
granted to service providers in the preceding three years.' 9 ' Prior to the eighth
amendment, the prospectus merely referenced the risk that the company would have
to rescind those shares at a cost of $25.9 million. ' However, the eighth amendment
added the statement "[w]e also understand that the Securities and Exchange
Commission has initiated an informal inquiry into this matter and certain state
regulators, including California, have requested additional information.'' 93
After Google released the eighth amendment, investors speculated that the
offering would be postponed. However, on August 17th, Google announced to
investors on its website and by electronic notices that it had formally asked the SEC
to close the auction at 4 p.m. If the SEC agreed to do so, Google would then
announce the final share price by 5 p.m. This announcement led some investors to
speculate that demand must have been sufficiently high to convince Google to ask
for the auction to close. 94 Furthermore, commentators speculated that for Google
to request final approval in the wake of the last filing, the bids received had to be in
the suggested price range of $108-135.29" Consequently, investors rushed to place
188. Id.
189. Of course, the ability to underprice could also be abused.
190. Amendment No. 7, supra note 173, at 39.
191. Google, Inc., Amendment No. 8 to Registration Statement (Form S-I), at 19 (Aug. 16,2004)
[hereinafter Amendment No. 8], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/0001
19312504141762/ds 1 a.htm. See also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Google Says It's Set to End StockA uction,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,2004, at CI (noting that the potential liability could cause Google to repurchase
shares at a price as high as $25.9 million).
192. Amendment No. 7, supra note 173, at 19.
193. Amendment No. 8, supra note 191, at 19.
194. Sorkin, supra note 191.
195. Google's1PORollercoaster, supra note 155; Sorkin, supra note 191 (quoting David Menlow,
president of IPO Financial Network, who stated: "I'm conclusion-jumping here, but it appears on the
surface they have enough bids to where they feel good about pricing the deal.").
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bids before the auction ended. However, the SEC delayed effectiveness until the
next day. 19
6
2. Ninth Amendment to the Registration Statement
Early on August 18, any buzz created the night before was killed by Google's
ninth amendment to the registration statement (hereinafter ninth amendment), which
lowered the estimated price range from $108-135 to $85-95.197 Consequently, some
investors slashed their overpriced bids, others switched to a low-bid strategy, and
others withdrew their bids altogether. Google also reduced the overall number of
shares sold, from 25.7 million to 19,605,052.198 Google stated that the large
reduction of shares would be achieved by selling fewer insider shares in the offering.
Wall Street analysts and journalists seized on Google's lower price range as a
huge sign of weakness. One columnist took this opportunity to attack Google
management for criticizing the bookbuilding process and choosing to have an online
auction:
The "go it alone" method that Google used was a total fiasco, just ridiculous. The
arrogance, the incompetence was beyond belief. Their own missteps and
misbehavior have brought much lower prices than they ever would have gotten for
the deal. Institutions, mutual funds and hedge funds all are boycotting the deal. So
the price will be artificially low. These guys will have totally messed it up for
themselves.'"
3. Registration Statement Declared Effective
Later in the evening on August 18th, Google's registration statement was declared
effective, and the auction closed. Google priced the shares at $85 per share, the
bottom of the price range; all bidders who bid $85 per share or higher would receive
shares.2"° Any bids below $85 would be rejected, and those bidders would not
receive any shares. Because Google reserved the right to deviate from the clearing
price, no one outside the process could know if the clearing price was in fact $85 or
if the clearing price was above or below that amount.20'
The final step in the process, the allocation process, was even more opaque than
the pricing step. Google had reserved the right to allocate its shares either in a pro
rata allocation or in a "maximum share allocation" based on an algorithm that
seemed to indicate that smaller bids would be wholly accepted while larger bids
196. Sorkin, supra note 191.
197. Google, Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Registration Statement (Form S-I), at 1 (Aug. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter Amendment No. 9], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/0001
19312504142742/ds1a.htm.
198. Id. at 2.
199. James J. Cramer, How to Buy Google: After the Deal, REALMONEY.COM, Aug. 18, 2004.
200. Dawn Kawamoto & Stefanie Olsen, Google to Go for $85 per Share, CNET NEWS.COM,
Aug. 18, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1038_3-5315472.html?legacy=cnet.
201. Form S-1, supra note 103, at 18 (describing how Google may set an initial public offering
price that "is near or equal to the clearing price").
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would receive a reduced number of shares." 2 Although Google did not make the
bids public, most critics believe that winning bidders received a 75% allocation.2"3
In other words, if a bidder bid $86 for 100 shares, the bidder only received 75 shares
at $85 per share.2"
4. First Day of Trading
Online IPO auctions are designed to capture investor demand and reduce first-day
share price increases; in fact, Google's S-I had warned that during the first day of
trading, the share price could even decrease. However, during the first day of
trading, Google shares rose in price 18% from the offering price.205 Coincidentally
and ironically, the average first-day share price increase for bookbuilding IPOs in
the United States is 18.8%.206 After the third day of trading, the Google stock price
was up 29%.207
This difference between the auction clearing price and the secondary trading price
could reflect several scenarios. First, the clearing price may have been over $85, but
Google management underpriced the shares. Second, the online auction platform
may have caused nervous investors to postpone buying until after the auction,
creating two demand curves, one representing auction share demand and the other
representing post-auction share demand. Third, the post-auction increase in share
demand reflected buying strategies of the professional investors who boycotted the
auction and waited to buy in the aftermarket. The true explanation is probably some
combination of these three scenarios.
D. Google Aftermath or Google Honeymoon?
The first-day 18% jump was only the beginning of an almost continuous rise in
the share price.208 From September 1 to November 1, 2004, the price rose steadily
to $196 per share, reflecting a 130% profit over less than three months.2 °9 Investor
demand was so high in the first month that not even the expiration of the first lockup
period, seen pre-IPO by analysts as impermissibly short, could affect the rising stock
price. The additional 4.7 million shares injected into the market on September 2
were quickly snatched up by investors, 210 and any momentary dip in share price was
regained within a day or two.2 '
202. Id. at 29.
203. Dawn Kawamoto & Stefanie Olsen, Google Gets to Wall Street andLives, CNETNEWS.COM,
Aug. 19, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1038_3-531709 l.html?legacy=cnet.
204. See id. (discussing Thornburg's Core Growth Fund grant of "roughly 75 percent of two share
groups it bid for a value of more than $85").
205. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 5-9.
206. Ritter & Welch, supra note 11, at 1.
207. Pete Barlas, Many Thumbs Neither Up Nor Downfor Google's Auction IPO, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, Aug. 27, 2004, at A4, http://www.investors.com/yahoofinance/2004w44/storyA04.asp.
208. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 5-9 to 5-10.
209. Sarah Lacy, For Google, a White-Knuckle Ride, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Nov. 17, 2004, at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2004/nf20041117_665 1_db016.htm.
210. Id.
211. Gregory Zuckerman & Kevin J. Delaney, Google's Stock Rise Nears 50%, WALL ST. J., Sept.
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Similarly, the share price declined slightly after the next two lockup expiration
dates on November 16 and December 16, but the stock rose steadily again from
$180 on December 17 to $216.80 on February 2, 2005.212 The last lockup
agreement expired on February 14, flooding the market with 90 million additional
shares, almost doubling the public float. 213 Although the dilution caused the share
price to temporarily decrease, the share price closed on March 28, 2005 at $181.42,
an amazing 112% increase over seven months. Beginning May 2005, Google's
stock price began to climb again and peaked close to $300 before closing at $286.70
on June 20, 2005.214
After the 40-day waiting period, analysts employed by Google's underwriters
covered its stock and were overwhelmingly positive in their "buy"
recommendations, compared to investment banks that were not participants in the
IPO.215  Over time, analysts' buy recommendations and high price targets, 216
combined with Google's favorable earnings reports, have supported the meteoric
rise of the share price.
In addition, although some institutional investors chose not to participate in the
online auction, these important market movers jumped on the after-market
bandwagon. For example, Fidelity Investments bought 15% of Google's Class A
shares in the first month of trading.217 Growing institutional investor demand both
supported and followed the share price, and by December 2004, 89% of Google's
float was held by institutional investors."'
The rapid price increase over the first ten months of trading casts some doubt on
the pricing of the Google IPO and on the online auction process. Some analysts
have attributed the rise in share price to a natural increase in Google's fundamental
value. They argue that the $85 initial price was suppressed due to the confusing
online auction process and the unflattering disclosures made close to the offering
date. Therefore, the combined uncertainty surrounding both the substance and the
29, 2004, at C 1.
212. Michael Liedtke, Google's High-Flying Stock Hits New Peak, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 31,
2005, at http://www.wtopnews.com/index.php?nid= 111 &sid=408464.
213. David A. Vise, Google Stock Up as Shares Hit the Market, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2005, at
E5. Interestingly, although 177 million shares became unrestricted February 11, Page, Brin, and CEO
Eric Schmidt declined to sell all their shares, entering into a trading plan known as a lob-5 plan, which
will cause shares to be sold in a predetermined manner. Google, Inc., Form 8-K, Current Report (Nov.
19,2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 288776/00011931250420088 1/d8k.
htm.
214. Posting of Christine Hurt, Who's Watching the Google Stock Price?, to Conglomerate Blog,
http://www.wtopnews.com/index.php?nid=lll &sid=408464 (June 20, 2005). After this article
reached the final editing stage, the stock rose to over $400 a share on November 17, 2005.
215. Zuckerman & Delaney, supra note 211 (reporting that CSFB, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley,
Thomas Weisel Partners, and Hambrecht gave price targets as high as $150).
216. Id. (reporting that in the preceding few weeks, CSFB had targeted Google stock at $225;
Goldman Sachs at $215; and American Technology Research at $210).
217. Gregory Zuckerman & Kevin J. Delaney, Heard on the Street: Google Rallies, Shakes Off
Some of the Skeptics, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2004, at C4.
218. Bambi Francisco, Net Sense: Getting Google Religion: Even the Skeptics are Converting,
Marketwatch.com, Nov. 30, 2004, available at http://www.cbs.marketwatch.com (follow "keyword
search" hyperlink, then "News & Commentary" hyperlink, and select "News Search" hyperlink).
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process of the IPO reduced demand." 9 Others attribute the volatility in pricing to
the small public float of Google shares.220 Because only a small number of shares
were available for sale during the first few months, demand exceeded supply,
causing the price to rise. Google sold approximately 30 million shares to the public
in the offering, then lockup expirations slowly released another 93 million shares
over five months, with another 177 million shares being released at the final lockup
expiration on February 14, 2005. However, not all of those shares have been sold
into the market; as of March 28, 2005, the Wall Street Journal reported that the
Google public float entailed 128 million shares, compared to 273 million shares
outstanding.22' As of June 23, the public float was only 180 million shares,
following huge sell-offs by Page, Brin, and CEO Eric Schmidt. The current public
float, at 191 million,222 is relatively small compared with Yahoo, which has a public
float of 1.2 billion shares.22a
Overall, the market, especially the IPO market, was strong in the second half of
2004. In October, 2004, 33 companies went public, the highest volume of IPOs in
a month since August 2000.224 The question remains whether this IPO boomlet
helped Google, or whether the successful Google opening created an IPO tidal wave
that floated all boats.
IV. DID GOOGLE FULFILL THE AUCTION FANTASY?
Whether the Google auction was successful depends what on criteria one uses to
define a successful IPO auction. To Wall Street, a successful IPO is one that creates
first day "buy" orders, with excess demand increasing the share price. On the other
hand, proponents of the auction process define a successful auction as one that
prices the original IPO shares as close to the market price as possible. In fact,
Hambrecht, the current U.S. auction proponent, considers an auction with a first-day
pop of 10% or more a failure. Therefore, the Google auction would have been a
failure in the eyes of at least one group no matter what happened on the first day of
trading. Because Google shares did increase in price on the first day, supporters of
online auctions criticized the auction process for not being a "true" auction. Auction
opponents criticized Google's confusing auction and managerial missteps for
destroying much of the value that could have been captured in the IPO and
depressing the price. Critics blamed Google both for alienating institutional
investors... and for scaring away retail investors.
219. Jason Draho, The Google IPO: What Happened and Why?, http://vcexperts.com (last visited
Mar. 30, 2005) ("A defining attribute of the Google IPO was the pervasive uncertainty.").
220. Francisco, supra note 218.
221. Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com (click on "Company Research," choose "Goog,"
click on "Key Facts") (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
222. Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com (click on "Company Research," choose "Goog,"
click on "Key Facts") (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
223. Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com (click on "Company Research," choose "Yhoo,"
click on "Key Facts") (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
224. Raymond Hennessey, IPO Outlook: Google 's Surge Fuels Comebackfor PO Market, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at C4.
225. Mark Calvey, IPO Rebel Defies Wall Street, S.F. Bus. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2005 (quoting Thomas
Weisel, CEO of Thomas Weisel Partners (one of Google's underwriters) as saying the Google auction
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For purposes of this analysis, this section will isolate the auction process and
critique it using three criteria of a successful IPO auction: a transparent process, a
resulting market price for the shares, and a democratic allocation. If these criteria
are met, then the auction process has in large part eliminated the abuses inherent in
the bookbuilding process. Also, if the Google auction was a successful IPO auction,
then the question to be answered is what impact the offering will have on future
IPOs.
A. Was it a True Auction?
Experts on the auction method questioned the Google auction's mechanisms. For
example, Alexander Ljungqvist 26 criticized Google's auction because it failed to
state a firm number of shares available227 and it did not commit to a method for
distribution if oversubscribed at a certain price. In fact, Google reserved the right
to employ a "pro rata allocation percentage" calculation or a "maximum share
allocation" calculation that would give small bidders their complete allocation, with
larger bidders receiving a small portion of their total bid.228 In addition, the
registration statement noted that Google's management did "not intend to publicly
disclose the allocation method that we ultimately employ." '29 For a mechanism that
is designed to increase transparency in the IPO process, these reservations were
inconsistent with that philosophy.
In fact, Google drastically changed both the price range and the number of shares
available in the auction's eleventh hour.230 Although the registration statement had
indicated that the issuer might increase both the price range and the number of
shares available if demand were high, the issuer failed to describe a plan if faced
with the opposite scenario.' In addition, the auction's size and the participation of
many investment banks created a hybrid auction process in which a large volume
of bidders were bidding at separate investment banks, and then those bids were
consolidated onto a second auction platform. The high number of anticipated
bidders prevented the Google auction from being distributed through the Hambrecht
OpenIPO platform. Instead, Google employed a gaggle of underwriters that had to
modify existing procedures to accommodate the auction process. 2 Therefore, the
was a failure because only two legitimate institutional investors participated in the auction, unlike in
a bookbuilding IPO where the investment banker can hand pick interested institutional investors to
receive original IPO shares). However, note that Weisel Partners was fined by the SEC in March 2005
for IPO abuses, including accepting excessive commissions in return for hot IPO allocations. See
Weisel Press Release, supra note 36.
226. Ben White, Aiming to Auction Its Way to a More "Inclusive" IPO: Complex Scheme Could
Confuse Small Investors, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2004, at El.
227. See Google, Inc., Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 36 (July 12,
2004) [hereinafter Amendment No. 3] ("In addition, we and the selling stockholders may decide to
change the number of shares of Class A common stock offered through this prospectus.").
228. Id. at 38-39.
229. Id. at 38.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 36.
232. See id. at 21 ("Only a small number of initial public offerings have been accomplished using
auction processes in the U.S. and other countries, and none on the scale of our offering. We expect
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auction process Google created was unique to Google both by design and by
circumstance.
B. Did the Process Eliminate Underpricing?
If the auction process is intended to eliminate underpricing by the underwriter,
then Google management has to explain how this process created a first-day share
price increase equal to the average first-day share price increase in bookbuilding
IPOs. However, the 18% increase in share price may not condemn the auction
process after close analysis of this unique IPO. Without having Google go public
in a bookbuilding process in an alternate universe, critics cannot say decisively that
the auction mechanism failed because it underpriced the shares. Arguably, had
Google gone public in a traditional bookbuilding offering, the underpricing would
have been more severe and the first-day pop would have been substantially larger
than 18%.233
In this alternative bookbuilding scenario, Morgan Stanley and CSFB would have
marketed Google and pre-allocated the bulk of the IPO shares to regular customers
and institutional investors. Moreover, the hordes of investors who wanted in on the
Google IPO would have bought in the aftermarket, driving the price much higher
than the offering price, generating an extremely nice profit for the institutional
investors and regular customers of Morgan Stanley and CSFB. A more enlightened
debate would compare Google's 18% first-day price increase with the first-day pops
for other popular technology IPOs, even in the post-bubble 2004 climate. For
example, shopping.com's October 2004 IPO saw a first-day increase of 50%.234
Similarly, Dreamworks Animation SKG, the animation studio behind Shrek and
Shrek 2, launched a November 2004 IPO and saw its share price increase 38% on
the first day of trading.23
However, a more cynical explanation can also be offered for the price increase.
With only hours left in the bidding process, Page and Brin drastically lowered the
price range, with the resulting $85 per share being 58% of the highest suggested
$135 price, but they also reduced the number of shares that they personally would
sell at that price. Instead, they were able to sell shares 180 days later at a much
higher price once they shrank the supply. In a traditional bookbuilding offering, the
investment bank can manipulate the price to ensure that certain parties capture part
of the demand curve. Likewise, Google insiders may have manipulated the share
price to accomplish the same thing.
Most participants agree that there were not enough bids on August 18 to allocate
all the shares at $135. However, in the end Google auction bidders received 75%
of their bids, strongly suggesting that the shares were oversubscribed at $85 and that
our auction structure to face scalability and operational challenges.").
233. Barlas, supra note 207 (quoting Jocely Arel, co-chairperson of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault
in noting that "[t]he bump was significantly less than what we saw in the 1990s where some of the
gains were in excess of 200%").
234. See Michael Brush, IPOs Return to Make the Rich Richer-Again, MSN MONEY, Nov. 10,
2004, available at http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P92944.asp.
235. Id
430 [Vol. 37
INTERNET AUCTIONS
the clearing price was more than $85.236 These facts seem consistent with the
argument that the shares were underpriced intentionally. In fact, Page and Brin have
been able to time the sale of their stock to coincide with share price increases.
Although the founders could not possibly have predicted that the share price would
increase to almost $300 in June 2005, they each were able to sell shares worth over
$100 million at that time, receiving about 31/2 times the value they would have if
they had sold the same shares in the August 2004 IPO.
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In any event, the end result of the Google auction process may have been
preferable to the bookbuilding system. The optimal system would have captured
demand for the benefit of the issuer, not the founders, but perhaps only incremental
change is available in the IPO process. Although the public would love to see more
power in the hands of retail investors, any movement away from the traditional
bookbuilding process that puts all power into the hands of the investment banks and
their institutional investor friends has to be a move in the right direction. At least
in the Google scenario, the spoils of the IPO went to the individuals who created the
successful company, not the financial intermediaries.
C. Did the Auction Create a Democratic Allocation?
The Google auction far exceeded a traditional bookbuilding IPO in terms of retail
investor participation. Even though Google did not disclose the names of the lucky
successful bidders, most commentators agree that substantially more retail investors
were granted original IPO shares than in bookbuilding auctions. 23' However, full
retail investor participation was not realized because of screening procedures, the
complexity of the auction process, and the lack of retail investor access to real
financial information regarding the issuer.239
The Google auction appeared accessible to everyone by the release of the third
amendment. Under the terms of the third amendment, any retail investor that could
open an account at Ameritrade or E*Trade with $2000 and bid for five shares, then
could be a Google shareholder. However, two important sentences were buried in
the 211-page prospectus:
Because each of the brokerage firms makes its own suitability determinations, we
encourage you to discuss with your brokerage firm any questions that you have
regarding their requirements because this could impact your ability to submit a bid. For
236. See IPO Watch: Pop Goes the Google, RED HERRING (Aug. 23, 2004),
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=10805&hed=IPO+Watch /*3a+Pop+goes+the+Google ("In
a nutshell, the offering price of $85 per share had to be below the clearing price."). See also Delaney
et al., supra note 186 (providing anecdotal evidence that most bids were in the $108 to $135 range or
higher).
237. Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com (click on "Company Research," choose "Goog,"
click on "Insider Transactions") (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (showing sales by date for all insider
sales).
238. See Michael J. Martinez, Getting in on Google: Was ItAll Worth It?, N. COUNTYTIMES, Aug.
25, 2004, available at http://www.nctimes./cornarticles/2004/08/26/business/news/2008028 25
04.txt.
239. Id.
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example, while one of our underwriters may view a bid for 100 shares at $121.50 per
share as suitable for an investor, another of our underwriters could determine that such
a bid is unsuitable for that same investor and therefore, not submit the bid in the
auction.240
Online investment banks like Ameritrade required investors to fill out an online
suitability questionnaire. 241' Reportedly, many investors at several brokerage houses
were rejected as unsuitable. 22 The questionnaire asked registrants for information
about financial stability, investment knowledge, and investment experience.243
Although many individual investors were able to bid for Google shares, many were
screened out of the process.2"
In addition, some larger brokerage houses had large minimum account balances;
for example, Fidelity required a $100,000 minimum balance. Other unnamed banks
required a $200,000 balance or a $500,000 balance.245 The largest retail brokerage,
Merrill Lynch, dropped out of the IPO; had it been a part of the syndicate, then
individual participation may have been increased.246
The process of registering for a bidder ID number at a Google website and then
registering for an account at a separate broker may have been too technologically
burdensome for some retail investors.247 Further, the assiduousness required of
bidders to be available electronically to change bids, confirm bids, and accept shares
may also have frightened some retail investors away. In addition, retail investors
suffered more subtly by receiving a barrage of information on the auction mechanics
but a mere trickle of information on Google's fimancials.24 The bidding instructions
required pages of text in the prospectus, compared with relatively little financial
information that retail investors received.24 9 As in ordinary IPOs, only institutional
investors, some investment banks, and a few individuals were invited to the road
shows, where detailed financial information is shared by the underwriters. 250 Most
individual investors were not invited to the road shows, and even institutional
investor managers complained that Google shared very little information in its road
shows.25' Practically, allowing access and allowing informed access are not the
same.
240. Google, Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Registration Statement (Form S-I), at 42 (Aug. 9, 2004)
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504135503/ds 1 a.htm.
241. Martinez, Getting in on Google, supra note 238.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Calvey, supra note 225.
245. See Barlas, supra note 207.
246. See Richard Waters, Poor Turnout Mars Google's IPO Democracy, FIN. TIMES (London),
Aug. 20, 2004, at 25.
247. See Barlas, supra note 207 (citing a former chief economist for the SEC as saying that the
web-based system was too confusing for individual investors due to its unwieldy interface). But see
Draho, supra note 219 (presenting the counter argument that the Google auction, while an uncertain
process, was no more of a confusing process than an eBay auction).
248. See Martinez, Getting in on Google, supra note 238.
249. Id.
250. See Charles Schwab & Co., 1999 SEC No-Action LEXIS 903, at *15 n.2 (Nov. 15, 1999).
251. See Choo, supra note 106, at 437-38.
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D. Did the Auction Open the Door for Other IPO Auctions?
Without doubt, the Google auction was more transparent, efficient and democratic
than a traditional offering would have been. The offering cannot transform Wall
Street overnight; however, the offering will surely have some impact on the future
of U.S. IPOs.
1. Only Google Has the Market Power to Buck the System
The Google IPO was a promising breakthrough in the market for IPOs in that the
company proved to investment banks that it could engage in an IPO on its terms and
according to its rules. Google set its own course by not rushing to market during the
technology boom, and thus it came to the negotiating table as a seasoned company
with some power. Unlike many start-ups, Google did not have to court investment
banks or rely on VC relationships to make introductions.2 52 Because of this unusual
power, Google was able to unilaterally determine who would underwrite the IPO
and how the IPO would proceed.2 a
However, this does not then mean that all start-up companies will now be able to
follow in Google's footsteps. Most start-ups do not have the ability to create their
own IPO buzz and therefore must rely on investment banks and their brokers to
market their shares to investors.254 Google's IPO was unique in that the issuer
combined the auction platform with the support of traditional investment banks.
Other auction IPO users have had the support of only one underwriter, Hambrecht
+ Co. 25 5 In addition, smaller companies will not have the clout to negotiate discount
rates with investment banks, like Google did.256
2. Google Does Provide a Blueprint for Others, Including Morningstar
The Google auction may open up IPOs to retail investors in the same way that
online brokerage firms opened up investing in individual stocks.25 7 Further, the
Google auction illustrates how the Internet creates transparencies, increases access,
and reduces transaction costs in IPOs through increased information and elimination
of fee-grubbing middlemen.
One aspect of the Google auction legacy is that the business world now knows
that the online auction is realistically viable. Many investors are now willing to
participate in an online auction, particularly if the auction mechanism is simplified.
252. Id. at 438-41.
253. Id.
254. See Dutch Treat, supra note 101 ("Less glamorous firms will still have to rely on the
traditional investment-banking road shows to drum up investor interest-and pay the big banking
fees.").
255. Choo, supra note 106, at 439.
256. The investment banks did support the offering by providing marketing support, but their
inexperience with the auction model may have contributed to pricing problems. See id. at 423. ("These
apparent missteps in the public eye may reflect a level of inexperience with the Dutch auction IPO
model, not only on the part of Google management, but also by the investment banks.").
257. See Dutch Treat, supra note 101.
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In addition, institutional investors may be more eager to participate in future
auctions after boycotting the Google auction and having to buy at higher, post-IPO
prices. Observers also have learned that the process is not doomed to fail
technologically. No bids were lost or ignored; the auction platform did not crash.
Google's auction eased any technological qualms about the online auction
mechanism.
Data supports the contention that other issuers may follow Google's lead. Since
the Google auction, seven companies have gone public using an online auction.25
However, the first online IPO following the Google IPO took place several months
later. Bofil Holding, Inc. (Bofi) went public in March 2005 using Hambrecht's
OpenIPO system.259 Bofil is a small, profitable company, and its $25 million IPO
was tiny compared to Google's auction.260 Although Bofil looked like a good
investment, the company actually had to fight against a negative perception of the
online auction system.261 Unfortunately, Wall Street continues to believe that
immediate aftermarket demand is the sign of a good LpO.2 62 When online auctions
work, there is no share price increase and no Wall Street excitement.263 Yet, when
online auctions, such as the Google auction, are underpriced, Wall Street reacts by
calling these auctions "Dirty Dutch" auctions. Thus, online auction issuers seem to
have a no-win situation.
Interestingly, Morningstar, Inc., an investment research firm, was the second
company to launch an online IPO after the Google auction.2e Morningstar, who had
announced its upcoming IPO in May 2004,265 reportedly had a falling out with its
traditional underwriters, Morgan Stanley.2 66 Then, it announced that it had chosen
W.R. Hambrecht to be its underwriter and would conduct an OpenIPO auction. 67
Morningstar also announced that it would pay discounted investment banker fees of
4% as compared to the traditional 7% fee.268
The Morningstar auction continues to lend more credibility to the online auction
mechanism. Unlike other issuers that have used the auction process, Morningstar
is a traditional, seasoned company that is not tied to the technology sector.269 To
have a financial services firm with ties to Wall Street abandon the bookbuilding
258. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 5-10.
259. Press Release, Bofi Holding, Inc., Bofil Holding, Inc. Announces Pricing of Initial Public
Offering (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www.bofiholding.com/news/PR/20050315.aspx.
260. Compare id., with Knowledge Wharton, supra note 168.
261. IPO Watch: Google's Shadow, RED HERRING (Mar. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=I 1474&hed=IPO+Watch%3a+Google/oe2%80%99s+s
hadow.
262. Knowledge Wharton, supra note 168.
263. Draho, supra note 219.
264. Steve Gelsi, IPO Report, Morningstar Boosts W.R Hambrecht (Jan. 10, 2005), available at
http://www.cbs.marketwatch.com.
265. Morningstar, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 2 (May 6, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1289419/000104746904016078/a2135433zs- 1.htm.
266. Gelsi, supra note 264.
267. Morningstar Inc., Amendment No. Ito Registration Statement (Form S-I), at 105-13 (Feb.
3, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1289419/000104746905002211 /a213
7905zs- I a.htm.
268. Id. at 109.
269. Gelsi, supra note 264.
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system in favor of an online auction sends a different type of signal. Morningstar's
auction avoided the problems that the Google auction encountered. All bidders
registered at Hambrecht + Co. and were required only to have a balance of $2000.
At that time, Morningstar's $140 million IPO was the largest IPO that Hambrecht
has handled as lead underwriter.270 Following the Morningstar lIPO, other firms to
use the OpenlPO platform were FortuNet, Inc., Traffic.com, Dover Saddlery, Inc.,
Avalon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Cryocor, Inc.
V. THE FUTURE OF IPO AUCTIONS
A. Google's Unique Auction is Not Representative
Unfortunately, Google does not make a perfect poster child for online auctions,
either pro or con, because of Google's uniqueness as an issuer.271 First, the Google
offering was one of the largest in U.S. history.272 Second, although Google had
inherent advantages in the auction process as a well-known company with marketing
clout, Google's auction also had some inherent disadvantages that would not exist
in other IPO auctions. Because of Google's household familiarity and strong
following, the auction had to be engineered to handle both high volume and high
interest. This "frenzy factor" is not present in most auctions.273 Many bidders were
merely interested in obtaining Google shares for the intrinsic value of being able to
say that they obtained the shares.7 4 The value of Google IPO shares was in that way
the fundamental value of the company plus the relational utility value of
participating in a once-in-a-lifetime event. Most IPOs, whether online auctions or
not, are not events in that same way. 275 For example, the Morningstar registration
statement contained three benign risk factors associated with the auction process,
compared to the nine risk factors listed in the Google registration statement.276
Moreover, Morningstar did not list as risks the possibility that large numbers of
unsophisticated investors who are "less price sensitive" would drive the stock price
above the price that sophisticated investors would pay.
270. Id.
271. Draho, supra note 219 ("[Ilt is important not to infer too much from the IPO on how well
auctions work because it truly was a one of a kind event.").
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Knowledge Wharton, supra note 168.
275. Id.
276. Amendment No. 3, supra note 227, at 16 ("Potential investors should not expect to sell our
shares for a profit shortly after our common stock starts trading.... Some bids made at or above the
IPO offering price may not receive an allocation of shares.... Potential investors may receive a full
allocation of the shares they bid for if their bids are successful and should not bid for more shares than
they are prepared to purchase.").
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B. Opening up the Road Show-Another NecessaryAspect ofDemocratizinglPOs
The promise of auction IPOs cannot be realized without loosening SEC rules on
road shows. Retail investors are at a disadvantage when bidding against institutional
investors with substantially greater access to company information. However, the
SEC has recently promulgated new rules that allow for the delivery of electronic
road shows to all interested parties, either simultaneous with live delivery or at a
separate time with some restrictions. 7 Overall, this simple change could improve
individual investors access to IPOs generally, although some critics have charged
that issuers and underwriters will always be able to give superior information to
favored investors. Only time will tell whether these new rules change
discriminatory information disclosure practices of investment banks and issuers.
The Internet's unlimited potential in distributing information to potential investors
regarding upcoming securities offerings27 eliminates many practical barriers to
opening up traditionally exclusive road shows to any interested investor. In fact, in
recent years the SEC issued several no-action letters that permitted issuers to
transmit live road shows via the Intemet. 7 9 Additionally, the SEC has allowed both
live and on-demand presentations to be viewed over the Internet and has also
allowed viewers to submit textual questions during the live presentation that may be
answered.28 However, prior to December 1, 2005, the SEC still limited the
audience for electronically transmitted road shows, resulting in the continued
277. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No.
52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. 230.433 (2006)), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8591.pdf (New SEC
Rules); Raymond Hennessey & Phyllis Plitch, IPO Outlook: SEC Proposes Increasing Role of Web
in IPOs, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 3, 2005, at C4.
278. One of the first issues that arose concerning the intersection of securities offerings and the
Internet was whether certain written materials, such as a preliminary prospectus, final prospectus, and
even annual statements, could be posted on the Internet or delivered to recipients via the Internet. See
Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Exchange Act Release No. 7233, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458
(Oct. 6, 1995). In addition, the Internet also allows for direct communication between the issuer and
the public regarding the company, the company's future offerings, current registered securities, and
relevant markets, thus creating the potential for violating securities laws via statements, including
hyperlinks, on a company's website. See Use of Electronic Media, Exchange Act Release No. 7856,
65 Fed. Reg. 25,843 (Apr. 28, 2000) [hereinafter SEC Release 7856].
279. See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co., 1999 SEC No-Action LEXIS 903 (Nov. 15, 1999) (later
qualified by Charles Schwab & Co, SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 146586 (Feb. 9, 2000));
Activate.net Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 739423 (Sept. 21, 1999); Thomson Fin. Servs.,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 575139 (Sept. 4, 1988); Net Roadshow, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1998 WL 40252 (Jan. 30, 1998) (regarding the transmission of road shows via the Internet to
"qualified institutional buyers" in a Rule 144A offering); Bloomberg L.P., SEC No-Action Letter,
1997 WL 739085 (Dec. 1, 1997); Net Roadshow, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 555935 (Sept.
8, 1997).
280. See Activate. net Corp., 1999 WL 739423, at *2 (describing how streaming technology would
allow viewers to transmit questions to the underwriter and the issuer to be answered in the order
received). Note that Activate.net is a third-party vendor that provides Internet services to multiple
underwriting firms, similar to other companies asking for no-action status for providing electronic road
shows, such as Private Financial Network, Thomson, and Bloomberg. This fact suggests that the rise
in electronic road shows was not reflective of a desire to make road shows more accessible to the retail
investor but of a profit-seeking motive of vendors looking for a new product.
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exclusion of most retail investors.28' In addition, the SEC had only made the use of
electronic road shows available to a set of investors virtually identical to those
"qualified investors who would customarily be invited to attend a traditional road
show,"2 2 not the general public.
Another lingering regulation barrier to making electronic road shows generally
accessible was the preclusion of written communications by the issuer during the
quiet period and before a registration statement is effective. Although face-to-face
road shows were allowed as oral communications during the quiet period, the SEC
maintained the written versus oral distinction in the face of Internet technology. The
rationale behind videotaped road shows was applied to videotaped road shows
shown on the Internet to selected viewers.2"3 This interpretation allowed Internet
transmission of road shows to a select group of investors while avoiding a
substantial revision of § 2(a)(10).2 4 However, with the recent expansive changes
to the rules regarding written communications during the registration period, even
new issuers will be able to offer both physical access and informational access to
their stock offerings.
C. The Status Quo
Unfortunately, the important players in the market for IPOs, the investment banks
and the institutional investors, have a vested interest in criticizing the Google IPO
and in making the online IPO auction concept disappear.8 5 The withdrawal of
Morgan Stanley from Morningstar's IPO after Morningstar decided to use an online
281. See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co., 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 903, at * 14 (indicating that road
shows will only be accessible to investors with accounts at the Schwab Signature ServicesTM Gold
level or above). Although the Schwab 1999 Letter contains a persuasive call for the SEC to open up
the road show to as many retail investors as possible, the group for which access was sought in 1999
comprised institutional investors and retail investors who either executed 24 trades a year with Schwab
or invested $500,000 in equity positions with Schwab. See id. at * 14 n. 1.
282. Activate.net Corp., 1999 WL 739423, at *3 (describing this set of participants as
"institutional investors, securities firms, trading and sales personnel from participants in the offering
and research analysts"). See also Thomson Fin. Servs., 1998 WL 575139, at *2 (noting the condition
that "the viewer is an institutional investor or other person of a type the underwriter would customarily
invite to a road show"); Net Roadshow, Inc., 1998 WL 40252, at *2 (regarding the transmission of road
shows via the Internet to "qualified institutional buyers" in a Rule 144A offering); Bloomberg L.P.,
1997 WL 739085, at *2 (affirming that "a viewer would not be able to receive the transmission unless
the viewer [was] an institutional investor, investment adviser or other person of a type the underwriter
would customarily invite to a road show"). But see Charles Schwab & Co., 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
903, at *4 (claiming that making road shows available to customers in Schwab's Gold level or above
would be vastly improving access to the retail investor).
283. See Private Fin. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 107175 (Mar. 12, 1997) (citing
In Exploration, Inc., 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2891 (Nov. 10, 1986); Producers Funding Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 30515 (Mar. 9, 1982).
284. Laura S. Unger, SEC Commissioner, Technology and Regulation: The Road Ahead, Address
before the San Diego Securities Institution (Jan. 27, 2000), available at 2000 WL 132740, at *4
(noting that the SEC staff seemed to be able to go no further at opening up road shows through no-
action letters given the existing regulatory framework).
285. Draho, supra note 219 ("The apparent highly profitable collusion that goes on between these
two groups in bookbuilt IPOs at the expense of issuers and retail investors obviously implies that they
have an interest in maintaining the status quo.").
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auction format is symbolic of traditional investment bank disdain for the online
process.286 Without investment bank support in marketing and research before and
after the IPO, few issuers will be brave enough to be FPO auction pioneers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Google auction is like Harry Potter's mirror at Hogwarts because it shows the
observer what the observer wants to see. 287 Those critics who denounce IPO
auctions and defend bookbuilding as the best IPO distribution method see the
Google auction as a failure.288 Specifically, they fault the Google IPO because the
auction offering price underpriced market demand, and Google left money on the
table. Google scared off both institutional investors and retail investors with its
confusing auction process and regulatory missteps. 289 On the other hand, auction
supporters see the Google auction as a necessary first step toward public acceptance
of the auction method.290 Some auction supporters claim that the Google auction
succeeded merely because retail investors who had never had the chance to
participate in an IPO received original IPO shares.291 In addition, if the share price
was underpriced, the underpricing was negligible compared to the expected
underpricing in a traditional bookbuilding IPO.
Because of the idiosyncratic nature of the Google auction, the lessons that can be
learned for future issuers are limited. However, with each additional issuer that uses
an online auction format, such as Google and Morningstar, the format becomes
incrementally more acceptable. At some point, the online auction mechanism could
become sufficiently viable as an alternative to issuers and force Wall Street to create
a complementary product to Hambrecht's OpenlPO.
286. See Gelsi, supra note 264.
287. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE 213 (paperback ed., Scholastic
Inc. 1999) (1998).
288. See Draho, supra note 219.
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Francisco, supra note 218.
291. Id.
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